Hamilton Park Health Care Cent v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Wo by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-1-2016 
Hamilton Park Health Care Cent v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare 
Wo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Hamilton Park Health Care Cent v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Wo" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 336. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/336 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HAMILTON PARK HEALTH CARE CENTER LTD, 
 




1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST 
 
   ________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00621) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
________________ 
  
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 29, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 




David Jasinski, Esquire 
Jennifer C. Van Syckle, Esquire 
Rebecca D. Winkelstein, Esquire 
Jasinksi, P.C. 
60 Park Place, 8th Floor 
Newark, NJ   07102 
 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Katherine H. Hansen, Esquire 
William S. Massey, Esquire 
Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP 
817 Broadway, 6th Floor 
New York, NY   10003 
 




OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Hamilton Park Health Care Center filed a petition to 
vacate an arbitration award in a dispute with the 1199 SEIU 
United Healthcare Workers East union. The District Court 
denied the petition and confirmed the award. On appeal, 
Hamilton Park asserts that the Court erred by approving a 
multi-year arbitration award when the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) only contemplated a single-
year award. Because the parties consented at arbitration to a 
multi-year award, we affirm this portion of the Court’s order.  
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 Hamilton Park also argues that, even if a multi-year 
award is permissible, the Court should have severed a 
provision authorizing a new round of arbitration at a later 
date. We agree; thus we reverse and remand as to this portion 
of the order.  
I. Background 
 Hamilton Park is a long-term care facility that was 
previously a member of a multi-employer bargaining group. 
Morris Tuchman, Esq. represented the group (referred to as 
“Tuchman Homes”) in negotiations with 1199 SEIU, which 
was the exclusive bargaining agent for the group’s employees 
(subject to exceptions not at issue here).1 In 2008, Tuchman 
Homes and the union agreed to a CBA beginning on March 
13 of that year and extending through February 28, 2013. The 
CBA gave the union the option to reopen negotiations in 
November 2011 to bargain for new wages, hours, and general 
terms and conditions of employment for the CBA’s last year 
(February 28, 2012–February 28, 2013). If the union 
exercised its right to reopen and the parties did not agree to 
terms by February 28, 2012, they could submit any 
unresolved items to binding interest arbitration.2  
                                              
1 We use “Tuchman Homes” to refer to the bargaining group, 
and we use “Tuchman” to refer to Mr. Tuchman.  
 
2 In interest arbitration, the parties ask the arbitrator “to set 
new terms and conditions of employment.” Lodge 802, Int’l 
Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, 
Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 835 
F.2d 1045, 1046 (3d Cir. 1987). By contrast, in rights 
arbitration, which is not at issue here, the arbitrator’s role “is 
to resolve disputes involving the interpretation or application 
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 The CBA provides that it cannot be changed “unless in 
writing, and signed by the authorized representatives of the 
parties.” It also says that the arbitrator cannot “add to, 
subtract from, or otherwise amend or modify the terms of this 
Agreement.” Although the CBA only authorizes interest 
arbitration for the contract’s last year, it does not expressly 
bar any other types of arbitration. Finally, the CBA empowers 
the arbitrator to “determine his jurisdiction” and grant “all 
appropriate remedies.”  
 In November 2011, the union invoked its right to 
reopen negotiations. The parties reached an impasse, and they 
submitted the unresolved issues to arbitration. One of the 
main sticking points was the 4.5 percentage point increase in 
contributions that was necessary to maintain the level of 
health benefits that employees received. The union wanted 
Tuchman Homes to cover the entire increase, but the latter 
opposed paying any of it. During a hearing on March 26, 
2012, the arbitrator, Martin Scheinman, Esq., suggested that 
the parties consider allowing him to fashion a multi-year 
award that went beyond the scope of the February 28, 2012–
February 28, 2013 jurisdiction provided by the CBA. The 
purpose of this would be to spread out increased employer 
contributions over a longer period of time. As Scheinman 
recounted in the award he ultimately issued, the parties 
“tentatively” agreed to the request for expanded jurisdiction. 
He said that, in subsequent ex parte meetings, they firmly 
committed to this plan. Specifically, he said that “[b]oth sides 
agreed my jurisdiction permitted a multi-year Award, at my 
discretion.” However, these agreements were never in 
writing.  
                                                                                                     
of terms and conditions of employment that the parties have 
themselves agreed to in their contract.” Id. at 1047.  
5 
 
 In November 2012, Scheinman issued a multi-year 
award that extended through June 2016. It dealt with, among 
other topics, wages and health benefits contributions. With 
respect to the dispute over health benefits, the award called 
for a 2 percentage point increase in employer contributions at 
the outset followed by a further 2.5 percentage point increase 
in March 2014.  
 Scheinman also included a provision allowing the 
union to reopen negotiations for the contract’s last year (June 
30, 2015–June 30, 2016) and to submit any resulting disputes 
to binding interest arbitration. The effect of Scheinman’s 
award was to create what courts frequently call a “second 
generation” interest arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 648 F. Supp. 2d 
193, 198 (D. Mass. 2009). As the name implies, this refers to 
a scenario where an arbitrator uses his authority to decide a 
particular dispute to impose a requirement, not previously 
agreed upon by the parties, to arbitrate future disputes.   
 Scheinman did not address why he included the second 
generation interest arbitration provision. Nor did he ever 
conclude that the parties consented to it. He did, however, 
explain his reasoning for including a reopener provision. He 
said he “followed the parties’ format,” derived from the 
2008–2013 CBA, of permitting the union to reopen 
negotiations for the contract’s last year. In both the 2008–
2013 CBA and Scheinman’s award, the reopener and 
arbitration provisions work in tandem (reopening followed, if 
need be, by arbitration). It appears that Scheinman presumed 
that the parties, having once (in the 2008–2013 CBA) elected 
to resolve disputes through interest arbitration, would 
continue to choose that model for future disputes.   
 Hamilton Park responded to the award by filing a 
petition in the District Court to vacate it. The crux of its 
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argument was that Scheinman exceeded his authority under 
the CBA by issuing a multi-year award instead of confining 
himself to the year ending February 28, 2013 and by inserting 
a second generation interest arbitration provision. Hamilton 
Park’s position was that it did not provide oral consent for 
Scheinman’s actions and that, even if it had, it would be 
insufficient because the CBA requires written authorization.  
 In support of the contention that it never provided 
consent, Hamilton Park submitted to the Court a letter its 
counsel had written to Tuchman along with an unsigned 
declaration from Tuchman that was attached to the letter. The 
letter stated that Hamilton Park’s counsel had spoken with 
Tuchman and prepared the declaration on his behalf based on 
that discussion. It closed by asking Tuchman to execute the 
declaration, which asserted that he “never consented to any 
modification of the CBA authorizing Scheinman to issue an 
award beyond one year.” However, Hamilton Park later 
informed the Court that Tuchman refused to sign the 
declaration.   
 Hamilton Park also submitted declarations from its 
chief financial officer, Donald Wuertz, and from Jacqueline 
Cousins, an administrator at Cranford Health and Extended 
Care, another member of the Tuchman Homes multi-
employer bargaining group. The declarations said that neither 
the group as a whole nor Hamilton Park individually gave 
Scheinman or Tuchman authorization for a multi-year award. 
But they are silent on whether Tuchman, as the group’s 
representative, authorized Scheinman to issue such an award. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 10 
and 9 U.S.C. § 11, and we have jurisdiction per 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(D) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “When reviewing a 
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district court’s denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration 
award, we review its legal conclusions de novo and its factual 
findings for clear error.” Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 
811 F.3d 116, 119 n.23 (3d Cir. 2016).  
III. Discussion 
 “There is a strong presumption under the Federal 
Arbitration Act [“FAA”] in favor of enforcing arbitration 
awards.” Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of 
Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation 
omitted). We review them under an “extremely deferential 
standard,” the application of which “is generally to affirm 
easily the arbitration award.” Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 
365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). This deference, of course, is subject 
to certain limitations. Indeed, “[e]ffusively deferential 
language notwithstanding, the courts are neither entitled nor 
encouraged simply to ‘rubber stamp’ the interpretations and 
decisions of arbitrators.” Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 
108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 For instance, the FAA gives district courts the 
authority to vacate awards where arbitrators “exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Also subject to vacatur are 
awards that “do[] not draw [their] essence from the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement,” Jersey Nurses Econ. 
Sec. Org. v. Roxbury Med. Grp., 868 F.2d 88, 88 (3d Cir. 
1989), that result from an arbitrator’s “own brand of 
industrial justice,” Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Paper, Allied-
Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Local No. 2-
991, 385 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), or that are contrary to “a well-defined and 
dominant public policy,” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon 
Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). With respect to the last category, 
because we are dealing with a CBA between a union and an 
employer, the public policy considerations embodied in the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) are particularly 
relevant. Moreover, district courts can modify awards in cases 
where “arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted 
to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the 
decision upon the matter submitted.” 9 U.S.C. § 11(b). 
 There are two aspects of the arbitration award that 
Hamilton Park asks us to review. The first is the issuance of a 
multi-year award. Because the CBA only authorizes a single-
year award, Hamilton Park would be on solid footing if it had 
not separately agreed to expand Scheinman’s jurisdiction. But 
it did reach such an agreement, and it is bound by it.  
 The other issue is the inclusion of a second generation 
interest arbitration provision. Here, by contrast, there is no 
evidence that Hamilton Park consented to what Scheinman 
included. Because this portion of the award violates the 
principles of both the FAA and the NLRA, it cannot stand.  
A. Multi-year award 
 Hamilton Park’s main contention is that there is no 
authority in the CBA for Scheinman to issue an award that 
goes through June 2016. This is true but ultimately not 
dispositive. That is because parties are permitted to “agree to 
allow an arbitrator to go beyond the express terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement.” High Concrete Structures, 
Inc. of N.J. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 
Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, 
Scheinman found that the parties made such an agreement. 
Specifically, his award states that “[b]oth sides agreed” to a 
“multi-year Award, at my discretion.”  
9 
 
 Meanwhile, Hamilton Park has presented no evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate that the agreement did not exist. The 
only evidence it produced shows that neither it nor other 
members of the bargaining group authorized Tuchman or 
Scheinman to issue a multi-year award. But there is no 
competent evidence that Tuchman did not agree to the longer 
award on behalf of the bargaining group.  
 That evidence might have come in the form of a signed 
declaration from Tuchman. But, as discussed, Tuchman 
declined to sign it. We do not assume that Tuchman’s refusal 
to sign the declaration is necessarily the same as a repudiation 
of its contents. Indeed, we note that counsel for Hamilton 
Park represented to the District Court that Tuchman, though 
he refused to sign the document, “did not deny that he did not 
authorize Arbitrator Scheinman to issue an award beyond one 
year.” On appeal, Hamilton Park vigorously challenges the 
arbitration award but fails to mention—even once—that 
Tuchman refused to sign a declaration that counsel had 
submitted to the District Court. The Magistrate Judge found 
the circumstances surrounding the declaration to be 
“troubling[].” No doubt. And even more troubling is 
Hamilton Park’s failure to acknowledge the incident in its 
briefing.   
 Hamilton Park places great emphasis on the lack of 
any writing memorializing the agreement to authorize a 
multi-year award. It argues that an oral agreement would 
violate the CBA, which requires any changes to be in writing 
and signed by authorized representatives. But we have held 
that, once parties are in front of an arbitrator, their decision to 
submit additional subjects to arbitration—even those beyond 
the scope of the CBA—need not be “express” and instead 
“may be based on other relevant . . . actions.” High Concrete 
Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219. Indeed, an agreement to allow 
an arbitrator to address particular issues “may be implied 
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from the conduct of the parties.” Teamsters Local Union No. 
764 v. J.H. Merritt & Co., 770 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1985). In 
our case, the parties’ relevant conduct was to authorize 
Scheinman to enter a multi-year award. And the evidence of 
this is Scheinman’s acknowledgement of the agreement in his 
award. 
 The CBA’s writing requirement thus does not get 
Hamilton Park relief from its agreement. For instance, in 
High Concrete Structures the employer argued that the 
arbitration award, which went beyond the terms of the CBA, 
violated both the clause declaring the agreement to be 
complete and final (i.e., an integration clause) and the 
provision preventing the arbitrator from changing the 
agreement’s terms. We disagreed, observing that nothing in 
the CBA expressly “prohibit[ed] the parties from agreeing to 
a submission which is broader.” 879 F.2d at 1219 (“[I]n 
determining the arbitrator’s authority, the court must look not 
only at the text of the collective bargaining agreement but 
also at the agreed submission.”). Similarly, nothing in the 
CBA prohibited Hamilton Park and the union from agreeing 
to arbitrate additional issues.  
 There are important policy considerations behind the 
rule from J.H. Merritt and High Concrete Structures. 
Specifically, there is a “strong federal policy favoring the 
speedy resolution of labor disputes through arbitration.” J.H. 
Merritt, 770 F.2d at 43. If a party, through its actions, were 
able to induce an arbitrator to issue an award outside the CBA 
and then challenge that award if it is unhappy with it, this 
policy would be frustrated. Id. Hamilton Park, having agreed 
to go beyond the CBA, is bound by that determination.  
 As a result, we cannot say that Scheinman “exceeded 
[his] powers” within the meaning of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(4). Nor does the award fail to “draw its essence from 
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the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,” Jersey 
Nurses, 868 F.2d at 88, because that requirement poses no 
obstacle where the parties agree to go beyond the scope of the 
CBA, High Concrete Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219. 
Meanwhile, there is no tension with a “well-defined and 
dominant public policy,” Exxon Shipping, 993 F.2d at 360 
(internal quotation marks omitted), as holding parties to their 
representations to an arbitrator by no means contravenes 
public policy. Finally, there are no concerns about an 
arbitrator meting out his “own brand of industrial justice,” 
Citgo Asphalt, 385 F.3d at 816 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), or giving an award based on “a matter not 
submitted” for arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 11(b), because here the 
evidence demonstrates that Scheinman had the parties’ 
authorization.  
 In one respect, however, the District Court erred in its 
analysis. Specifically, it determined that “the Court cannot 
challenge Arbitrator Scheinman’s finding that the parties 
consented to expanding his jurisdiction.” For this, the Court 
relied on the proposition that, as a general matter, we will not 
“reconsider the merits of an [arbitration] award even though 
the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or 
on misinterpretation of the contract.” United Paperworkers 
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). 
However, this analysis overlooks two considerations. The 
first is that courts are authorized to review challenges that go 
“to the making of the agreement to arbitrate.” Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The second is that we can inquire 
into whether an award is obtained “through the arbitrator’s 
dishonesty.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. All of this goes to say that 
our deferential review of arbitration awards does not deprive 
Hamilton Park of the ability to establish that, contrary to 
Scheinman’s representations, it did not agree to a multi-year 
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award. The fatal flaw for Hamilton Park, however, is that it 
has not done so.  
B. Second generation interest arbitration provision 
 The next issue is Scheinman’s inclusion of a second 
generation interest arbitration provision, which allows the 
union to force arbitration on any disputes that arise during 
negotiations over the award’s last year (June 30, 2015–June 
30, 2016). This is not a question of Scheinman’s authority to 
issue an award covering the year ending June 30, 2016. 
Rather, it is purely a question of the remedy that he imposed.3 
And unlike with the extension of jurisdiction to encompass a 
multi-year award, Scheinman did not find that the parties 
agreed to a new arbitration provision. Because Hamilton Park 
did not consent to the provision, its inclusion is contrary to 
both the FAA and the NLRA. Although this is a matter of 
first impression for us, we join the company of several of our 
sister courts that have found second generation interest 
arbitration provisions to be impermissible without mutual 
consent.   
 As a starting point, under the FAA arbitration “is 
strictly a matter of contract.” Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) 
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999). As a result, a basic 
premise is that we “initially must find that there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate.” Century Indem. Co. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 
2009). And “[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts 
have no authority to mandate that [it] do so.” Bel-Ray, 181 
                                              
3 The parties gave Scheinman the authority to impose all 
“appropriate remedies.” The key word, of course, is 
“appropriate.” We must therefore determine whether the 




F.3d at 444. Where a party has not executed an express 
agreement to arbitrate, we must therefore discern whether any 
“traditional principles of contract and agency law” can make 
it nonetheless bound by an arbitration provision. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the initial contract was the CBA. The parties 
subsequently enlarged Scheinman’s authority under the oral 
agreement to permit a multi-year award. However, neither the 
CBA nor the oral agreement contemplated the arbitration of 
disputes for the year starting June 30, 2015. Nor did Hamilton 
Park, through its conduct, imply that it agreed to such a 
provision. It certainly was permitted—similar to what it did 
when it consented to the longer award—to agree to a new 
arbitration provision. But there is no evidence that it did.  
 To the extent Scheinman attempted to infer Hamilton 
Park’s consent by reference to the arbitration provision in the 
2008–2013 agreement, that inference was flawed. Under this 
reasoning, Hamilton Park’s agreement to arbitrate disputes 
for that contract’s last year (February 28, 2012–February 28, 
2013) means that it would consent to having the same 
arrangement in place for the new award’s last year (June 30, 
2015–June 30, 2016). But neither Scheinman in his award nor 
the union on appeal has identified any principle of contract or 
agency law that would require a party to arbitrate in the future 
merely because it has agreed to do so in the past.   
 The District Court notes that Hamilton Park, in 
agreeing to a multi-year award, never expressly “defin[ed] the 
boundaries” of Scheinman’s discretion and never objected 
during the arbitration process to the inclusion of the second 
generation interest arbitration provision. But this gets things 
backwards. Our starting principle is not that parties can be 
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forced to arbitrate unless they agree otherwise, but rather that 
“[i]f a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no 
authority to mandate that [it] do so.” Bel-Ray, 181 F.3d at 
444. And even assuming there might be circumstances where 
a lack of objection can signal consent, this is not one of them. 
There is no evidence that Hamilton Park had any reason to 
suspect prior to the issuance of the award that it would 
contain a second generation interest arbitration provision. A 
party cannot object to what it cannot reasonably foresee.  
 Apart from being untethered from the principles 
embodied in the FAA, the second generation interest 
arbitration provision also conflicts with the NLRA’s public 
policy considerations. Under the NLRA, employers and 
unions are required to bargain over “wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment.” Brockway Motor 
Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 725 
(3d Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). On these 
subjects, the parties have an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 
342, 349 (1958). By limiting mandatory bargaining to these 
topics, the NLRA embodies the public policy that, for all 
other subjects, parties are “free to bargain or not to bargain, 
and to agree or not to agree.” Id.  
 The question of whether to require arbitration does not 
relate to any of the mandatory bargaining subjects. As a 
result, the NLRA allows parties to accept or reject an 
arbitration provision as they see fit. However, if arbitrators 
were free to do as Scheinman did here, parties would have no 
control over the continued inclusion of an arbitration 
provision. This would allow for an end-run around the 
NLRA’s public policy considerations.  
 To see how this problem plays out in practice, we start 
with the undisputed premise that, because an arbitration 
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provision is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, Hamilton 
Park was under no obligation to agree to arbitration in the 
2008–2013 CBA. It is only because Hamilton Park reached a 
limited agreement—the inclusion of an arbitration provision 
in a single CBA—that Scheinman was involved in the case in 
the first instance. He then used this agreement to expand 
Hamilton Park’s arbitration requirements. If an arbitrator, 
once empowered to decide a particular dispute, could then 
require all future disputes to be arbitrated, a party that has 
once agreed to a limited arbitration provision could forever be 
held hostage to it. As the Fifth Circuit explained,  
a party . . . may find itself locked into that 
procedure for as long as the bargaining 
relationship endures. Exertion of economic 
force to rid oneself of the clause is foreclosed, 
for the continued inclusion of the term is for 
resolution by [the arbitrator, who is] an 
outsider. Parties may justly fear that the 
tendency of  arbitrators would be to continue 
including the clause, for that is exactly what 
happened in this case. 
NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants’ Union 
No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161, 1169 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 Because second generation interest arbitration 
provisions imposed without consent violate the contract law 
principles of the FAA and the public policy goals of the 
NLRA, we hold that they are unenforceable. As discussed, 
there is no evidence that Hamilton Park agreed to have such a 
provision. Hence it must be removed from Scheinman’s 
award.  
 Our holding tracks the overwhelming consensus of 
federal courts. See, e.g., Local Union No. 666, Int’l Bhd. of 
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Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Stokes Elec. Serv., Inc., 225 F.3d 
415, 425 (4th Cir. 2000); Local 58, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Se. Mich. Chapter, Nat’l Elec. 
Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 43 F.3d 1026, 1032 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Am. Metal Products, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n 
Local Union No. 104, 794 F.2d 1452, 1456–57 (9th Cir. 
1986); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 14 v. Aldrich 
Air Conditioning, Inc., 717 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Columbus Printing, 543 F.2d at 1169–7. See also Globe 
Newspaper, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (“It appears that every 
court to have considered this question has concluded that this 
type of second generation interest arbitration provision is 
unenforceable . . . .”).4 
* * * * * 
 Our deference to an arbitrator’s award does not include 
the rubber stamping of a self-perpetuating arbitration 
provision that the parties did not agree to include. We 
therefore reverse the portion of the District Court’s order 
approving the inclusion of a new arbitration provision for 
disputes arising for the year starting June 30, 2015. We 
remand the case with instructions for the Court to void only 
the portion of the award providing for that arbitration. See, 
                                              
4 The District Court notes that the typical case where a court 
voids a second generation interest arbitration provision occurs 
when the union insists on its inclusion. The Court correctly 
observes that there is no evidence that the union did so here, 
meaning that Scheinman may have included it on his own 
initiative. However, this has no bearing on our analysis. Even 
if the impetus for the provision comes from an arbitrator 
rather than a party, the result is the same: the imposition of a 
requirement to arbitrate. Unless both parties consent to that 
arrangement, it is unenforceable.  
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e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445 (“[A]n 
arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the 
contract.”). We affirm the Court’s order in all other respects.5  
                                              
5 In the event that the parties have already engaged in 
arbitration for the June 30, 2015–June 30, 2016 contract year, 
nothing in this opinion prevents them from raising to the 
District Court any arguments that may exist as to why any or 
all of the resulting award should be enforced notwithstanding 
the invalidity of the arbitration provision.  
